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etter to the Editor
esponse  to  ‘Testing  the  validity  of the  “value  of a
revented fatality”  (VPF)  used  to assess  UK  safety
easures’
with  better instruments and a deeper understanding of the
issues.n their paper ‘Testing the validity of the “value of a prevented
atality”  (VPF) used to assess UK safety measures’, Thomas and
aughan  (TV) revisit a study reported in Carthy et al. (1999)
nd  claim that “. . . no reliance can be placed on the Carthy
tudy, in which so many  flaws and inconsistencies have been
dentified.  . .”.
We consider that various of TV’s criticisms are based on
njustifiably negative and, in some cases, completely mis-
aken  interpretations of our analytical procedure and results.
ad  they shown us a draft of their paper prior to submitting it
or publication, then as co-authors of the Carthy et al. paper
e  could have clarified a number of points. Since we  were not
iven  that opportunity, and since the Carthy et al. study has
layed  a key role in the valuation of safety in UK public safety
olicy,  it is important to alert readers to the misunderstand-
ngs and misrepresentations in TV’s paper.
In what follows, we  focus on six issues:
 TV’s selective use of quotation to suggest that some of us
are  resistant to fresh studies to check and possibly revise
the  Value of Preventing a Fatality (VPF) used in UK public
policy.
 TV’s inaccurate account of the “chained approach” used in
the  Carthy et al. study.
 TV’s false assertion that we  failed to acknowledge or jus-
tify  what they refer to in Section 2 of their paper as the
“anomalous substitution” of data.
 TV’s mistaken conclusion that the levels of wealth implied
by  our model and analytical procedure are ridiculously low.
 TV’s misleading claim that we  did not acknowledge the dis-
parity  between the results of our 2- and 3-stage chained
approach.
 TV’s criticism of our recommendation that the VPF should
be  guided by the trimmed mean and median emerging from
our  study rather than the much  higher untrimmed mean.
In  the discussion that follows, we employ TV’s notation
hen it differs from that used in Carthy et al.DOI of original article:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2014.07.001.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1.  TV’s  Section  1:  Introduction
Early in their Introduction, and also in their Conclusions sec-
tion,  TV reproduce part of a sentence from another report
which  they select and frame in a way  which may  mislead
readers. TV say: “Despite the fact that it has been many  years
since  the survey was made, a 2011 report for the Department
for  Transport, with authors in common with the Carthy study,
recommended “against any early new full scale WTP  [willing-
ness  to pay] study” (Spackman et al., 2011). Thus the opinion
survey  of the 167 people in 1997 remains the evidential base for
the VPF used by the Government and others in the UK today.”
The  first point to note is that the 1997 ‘opinion survey’ –
which  was  in fact a careful one-to-one interview typically tak-
ing  between 30 and 60 min  per respondent – is not the sole
basis  for the VPF. In Section 5 of Spackman et al. (2011), readers
can  find a brief history of other studies that have contributed
to  the evolution of the current VPF.
Secondly, the reason why the Spackman et al. report (two
of  whose co-authors – Jones-Lee and Loomes – are also co-
authors  of the Carthy et al. paper) recommended against an
early  new full scale WTP  study was  not because of any compla-
cency  about the 1997 study, as TV’s wording seems to suggest.
On  the contrary, in the course of their Section 5, Spackman
et  al. point out a number of the practical problems encoun-
tered  in the various surveys, including the 1997 study. Section
6  of that report then discusses other studies since 1997 that
provided  further evidence of practical challenges – not least,
the  tendency for extra ‘links’ in the ‘chain’ to result in larger
estimates  – and considers reasons for those practical diffi-
culties.  And Section 7 suggests various ways in which the
difficulties  might be further explored before any new full scale
study  is undertaken. The spirit of the recommendation is
clear:  it is not to deny the difficulties or to protect the 1997
results,  but rather to engage with the difficulties, improve
upon  the methods and then undertake a new large scale study
294  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 293–298We  reproduce the first part of the paragraph from Spack-
man  et al.’s Executive Summary (p.ii) from which TV selected
the  quote so that readers can see it in context:
“We conclude that the chained approach is in principle
superior to other stated-preference procedures that have so
far been used to estimate WTP-based values of fatality risks.
There  are nonetheless important outstanding problems. We
therefore recommend against any early new full scale WTP
study.”1
Later in their introduction, TV claim to summarise the
essential features of the chained approach used in Carthy
et  al. to derive a VPF. They state that the chained approach
begins by “. . . first eliciting from the person a statement of
how  much  he would spend to reduce the probability of a lesser
injury.  . .”. This statement is wrong. In fact, the first questions
ask  respondents to indicate the maximum sum they would be
willing to pay for a certain and complete cure for the lesser
injury  concerned; and also the minimum sum they would
accept  as compensation for the certainty of suffering the injury.
The  implied rate at which the respondent would be willing to
trade off wealth against a reduction in the probability of suf-
fering  the injury can then be inferred from these responses
using  basic Expected Utility Theory. One of the reasons for
developing  the chained approach was  precisely because of the
difficulties  that a proportion of respondents have with mix-
tures  of money and probability judgments within the same
question  – see, for example, Beattie et al. (1998). Thus the first
part  of the process sets probabilities to one side and focuses
on  the wealth-injury trade-off under certainty, leaving prob-
ability  trade-offs to subsequent questions where no money
amounts  are involved. If TV wish to present a serious critique
of  the chained approach, they should at least summarise it
correctly.
2.  TV’s  Section  2:  Data
TV claim that in Carthy et al. (1999) “. . . there are inconsis-
tencies in the results that are derived” and that “the number
of  responses that can reasonably be used in defining the VPF
is  less than the authors propose.” They also state that “. . .
there  are discrepancies in the application of the various utility
functions,  with values produced by one utility function being
labelled  and used as if they came from a different one” and
that  “This anomalous substitution does not appear to have
been  acknowledged by the authors, nor justified”.
In fact, the 34 cases which TV describe as “inconsistencies
in the results” are those in which the respondent’s stated will-
ingness  to pay for a complete cure for a particular injury (MAP)
was  greater than or equal to the sum that he/she would be will-
ing  to accept in compensation for suffering the injury (MAC).
Such  cases cannot be accommodated by a strictly concave util-
1 A fuller explanation is given in Spackman et al.’s Section 7.5:“In
the  light of the patterns that have been reported in many of
the  studies reviewed here, it would be unwise to move directly
to  a new large-scale representative sample survey that simply
repeats  previously used designs. Smaller-scale and more focused
research  investigating the issues under the three headings above
would  be highly desirable precursors to any new survey. Even if no
such  survey could be funded in the near future, the results from
these  investigations should help inform any re-analysis of existing
datasets  and enable us to narrow, perhaps substantially, the uncer-
tainties  and the intervals around the VPF and VPI figures used for
policy.”ity of wealth function and so in order to compute a marginal
rate  of substitution of wealth for risk in these cases we  applied
a  linear utility of wealth function whenever MAP = MAC  and a
strictly convex, positive exponential utility of wealth function
whenever  MAP > MAC. This is explicitly and clearly stated in
the  first paragraph of Section 3.3 of Carthy et al. TV’s claim
that  we did not acknowledge this procedure is therefore false;
and  TV are wrong to say that we used the Negative Exponen-
tial  utility function in such cases, as they would have realised
if  they had done the relevant calculation, since the Nega-
tive  Exponential utility function produces a completely different
result  from the one that we derived and reported in the data
that  we provided.
Linearity or convexity of the utility of wealth function is in
no  way  inconsistent with the theory underpinning the anal-
ysis  applied in Carthy et al. Indeed, local convexity of the
utility  of wealth function has often been used as a means of
explaining  the widespread tendency of people to participate
in  actuarially less than fair, small-stake, large-payoff financial
gambles  – see, for example, Markowitz (1952). Our inclusion of
the  34 cases in which MAP ≥ MAC is therefore entirely permis-
sible  and does not in any way  render our results “inconsistent”.
Once that is understood, the bulk of TV’s Sections 5 and 6 are
seen  to be redundant.
In  retrospect, however, perhaps it would have been better to
have used an unconstrained power functional form: that is, a
single formulation that would have covered the full spectrum
of  concavity, linearity and convexity. This would have avoided
some  of the misunderstandings above without making any
substantial  difference to the analysis or key results.
3.  TV’s  Section  4:  The  wealth  of
respondents
In this section TV assert that “The wealth, wi, of each
respondent emerges as an intermediate result that allows the
individual  VPFs, mDi(1), to be calculated for the Constrained
Power, Logarithmic and Negative Inverse utility functions . . .”
and that “These [wealth] figures are less than 10% of the aver-
age  net wealth of UK adults (aged 18 or over) in 1997. . .”. They
conclude  that “If the wealth of the respondents in the survey
could  be shown to have been much  higher than the predicted
wealths  generated by the utility functions used by Carthy et al.,
then this new inconsistency between predicted and actual
wealths  would cause their methods to fail once more”.
Unfortunately, TV’s argument and conclusions in this sec-
tion  and in their Appendix B are based on a fundamentally
flawed interpretation of the model in Carthy et al. That model
definitely  does not entail a specific level of wealth for any of the
utility  functions that we employed. There can be no inconsis-
tency  between our “predicted” levels of wealth and the actual
levels,  since there are in fact no predicted levels.
More specifically, in each of what TV refer to as the
Constrained Power, Logarithmic and Negative Inverse utility
functions,  we defined the individual’s utility of wealth func-
tion,  U(w), conditional on normal health as U(w) = F(w − ˇ) and
his/her  utility of wealth function, I(w), conditional on suffer-
ing  injury I as I(w) = F(w − ˇ) − ˛. For example, in the case of the
logarithmic utility function we set U(w) = ln (w − ˇ) and I(w) = ln
(w  − ) − ˛. Clearly,  ˇ therefore constitutes a “horizontal shift”
parameter that effectively determines the horizontal location
of  the graph of U(w) in relation to initial wealth and  ˛ a “vertical
shift”  parameter that determines the vertical location of the
Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 293–298 295
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wraph of I(w) in relation to U(w).2 But it is clear from TV’s Eqs.
B.1),  (B.13) and (B.21) that they have failed to take account of
he  horizontal shift parameter  ˇ and have, as a result, defined
he  utility functions as U(w) = F(w) and I(w) = F(w) −  ˛ respec-
ively. It therefore follows that when our analysis produces the
esult  that w¯ −  ˇ = v (where w¯ is the individual’s initial level
f  wealth) for particular MAP  and MAC  responses, TV illegiti-
ately  set  ˇ equal to zero and wrongly infer that w¯ = v. The
ey  point is that while our analysis produces an unique value
or w¯ −  ˇ, it most certainly does not do so for either w¯ or ˇ
ndividually.
This  error also substantially weakens TV’s argument that
ur  analysis “. . .fail[s] to come even close to predicting the
ame  level of wealth under injury X and injury W for the same
erson”.  While the value of (w¯ −  ˇ) implied by the MAP and
AC  responses for injury X does tend to differ somewhat from
he  value of (w¯ − ˇ) implied by the same individual’s MAP and
AC  responses for injury W under a given specification of
he  utility of wealth function, the extent to which they differ
s,  in most cases, only a small fraction of the typical indi-
idual’s  level of wealth in the UK. In addition, TV’s claim in
heir  Appendix B3 that the Negative Inverse utility function
mplies  a level of wealth that is twice the wealth predicted by
he Logarithmic function is completely misguided, given that
here  is absolutely no reason why  the shift parameter  ˇ should
e  the same in the two cases (though TV force it to be so by
istakenly setting it equal to zero).
.  TV’s  Section  3:  Testing  the  validity  of  the
wo-injury  chained  method
n this section TV focus on the two different estimates of
he  marginal rate of substitution of wealth for risk of injury
,  denoted by mXi, that the data from our study imply for
ach  respondent. In particular, for each respondent the first of
hese  two estimates (denoted by TV as mXi(1)) can be obtained
irectly from his/her MAP  and MAC  responses for injury X,
hile  the second estimate (denoted mXi(2)) can be obtained by
pplying  the chained approach using a direct estimate of the
arginal  rate of substitution of wealth for lesser injury W, mWi,
n  conjunction with the individual’s response to a Standard
amble (SG) question involving injuries W and X.
In  theory, for a respondent with error-free deterministic
references, these two estimates would be identical, or at
east  very similar. However, in practice there were a number
f  substantial differences. TV highlight these differences by
egressing  mXi(2) on mXi(1) with a linear regression constrained
2 It might, of course, be objected that in the case of the Logarith-
ic  and Constrained Power specifications, these utility functions
re  well-defined (and in the Negative Inverse case, realistic) only
or  levels of wealth, w, satisfying the condition w −  ˇ ≥ 0, and
ence  w ≥ ˇ. However, strictly speaking, these specifications of the
tility  function were intended to be applicable only for levels of
ealth  such that w¯ − x ≤ w ≤ w¯ + y, where w¯ is the individual’s
nitial wealth and x and y are, respectively, his/her MAP and MAC
mounts  for injury I. The key point is then that in all cases in which
he  strictly concave utility functions were employed (i.e.cases in
hich  x < y) it can be shown that w¯ −  ˇ ≥ x (and hence w¯ − x ≥ ˇ), so
hat  since we considered only levels of wealth such that w ≥ w¯ − x,
t  follows that these levels of wealth satisfy the condition w ≥ ˇ.
he  utility functions are therefore well-defined for the values of w
o  which they were applied. In addition, the possibility that other
pecifications of the utility function might apply for w < w¯ − x or
 > w¯ + y makes no difference whatsoever to our analysis.to pass through the origin and find that, in the most striking
case,  the regression coefficient is more  than 8 (i.e. significantly
greater than the unity entailed by theory) and that the R2 is
less  than 0.08. As a result, TV claim that “Based on the data
collected  for the Carthy study, it has to be concluded that the
chained  approach is devoid of validity”. In addition, they assert
that  “Surprisingly, Carthy et al. make no acknowledgement
of the internal inconsistencies that their two-injury chained
method  generates”.
In  response to these criticisms, we  would make the follow-
ing  points. First, as noted by TV when discussing their Eq. (14),
any  discrepancy between the 2-stage estimate of the VPF and
the  3-stage estimate is entirely due to the difference between
mXi(2) and mXi(1). Given that we  reported the untrimmed mean,
median and standard errors for both the 2-stage VPF (Table 2 in
Carthy et al.) and the 3-stage VPF (Table 6 in Carthy et al.) and
drew  attention to the differences between them, it should be
clear to any reader who has understood our approach that we
were  fully aware of, and open about, this discrepancy. Indeed,
in  Section 3.5 of our paper, we  explicitly stated that “Compar-
ing  the results reported in Table 6 with those given in Table
2,  it is clear that . . .the means and standard errors in Table
6  are effectively an order of magnitude larger than those in
Table  2 which is, prima facie, somewhat alarming”; and in our
Concluding  Comments we noted that “The second negative
feature  of the study’s findings is the discrepancy between the
estimates  of mD [i.e. the VPF] obtained on the basis of direct
chaining based on equation (27) and those derived on the
basis  of indirect chaining via equation (28)”. TV’s claim that we
made no acknowledgement of these internal inconsistencies
is  therefore a serious distortion of the truth.
Next, we consider TV’s assertion that their regression
results indicate that the chained approach is “devoid of valid-
ity”.  In their attempts to condemn the method, they verge on
misrepresentation. In relation to the linear regression result
for  what they call the Constrained Power function3 – see their
Fig.  2 – they say “the degree of linear correlation is almost
non-existent”, as would typically arise when the Pearson cor-
relation  coefficient is between −0.19 and +0.19. However, the
fact  is that the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.268 and is
significantly  positive at the 1% level. Moreover, the size of the
slope  coefficient owes much  to just 2 of the 158 observations.
Respondents 43 and 51 generated the most extreme values for
mXi(2) – £1.57 m and £3.17 m respectively – and if just these two
observations are set to one side, the slope coefficient falls from
8.24  to 3.27.
Of  course, we  are not suggesting – and never did – that there
is  no significant disparity. The linear correlation, although
significantly positive, is quite weak. The truth is that the
relationship is much  better described as nonlinear: a power
functional form of regression provides a considerably better fit
(exponent  = 1.087) and under these circumstances the correla-
tion  is more  appropriately measured by Spearman’s  = 0.656,
a  positive correlation which is significant at the 0.1% level.
That  having been said, there is no doubt that in practice the
data  constitute a significant departure from what the standard
3 Actually, as far as we can tell, this is the result one gets when
applying the unconstrained power function which we said earlier
we  wished we had used: it permits inclusion of all the cases where
MAP  ≥ MAC and the only cases which are excluded are 6 where mWi
is undefined so that mXi (2) cannot be computed, plus 3 where there
is  no usable Standard Gamble response linking W and X.
296  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 293–298deterministic theory would entail. But rather than simply try-
ing to write off the methodology, TV might have done better
to  consider what is causing the disparity and, on that basis, to
have reached an informed view about what judgments might
or  might not be supported by the data.
To make some progress in this respect, consider what
would have been required in order for the equality between
mXi(2) and mXi(1) to have held. Since mXi(2) is obtained by taking
the direct value for W, mWi,and multiplying it by a factor mea-
suring  how much  worse X is judged to be than W based on the
individual’s  SG response, then mXi(2) and mXi(1) will coincide if
mXi(1) is higher than mWi by that same factor.
To  illustrate the issue – and the scope for dispar-
ity – consider respondent 51. He/she gave MAC  and MAP
answers which, under the Power specification, generated
mXi(1) = £28,918 and mWi = £16,000. On this basis, we might con-
clude  that respondent 51 judged X to be almost but not quite
twice  as bad as W.4
But now consider his/her SG response: he/she was  only pre-
pared  to take the smallest possible extra risk of X in order to
have  a very high chance of avoiding all of the ill effects of
W  – a response which, under Expected Utility assumptions,
translates into regarding X as nearly 200 times as bad as W.
When  this response is combined with mWi = £16,000, it pro-
duces  mXi(2) = £3,168,000.
This  is the most extreme case, but it illustrates a more  gen-
eral  tendency in people’s responses that leads to the indirect
estimate,  mXi(2), often being rather higher than the direct esti-
mate  of mXi(1): namely, the way  in which SG responses are
liable  to produce much  higher ‘multiples of badness’ factors
than  MAC  and MAP  responses.
If  we  think back to the descriptions of injuries W and X, we
can  get some broad feel for their relative badness by thinking
about  the timelines involved. Both involve an initial period of
hospitalisation,  but the period for W is about 20–25% of the
time  for X. And both involve a further period of improvement
in  the course of returning to full health, with the period for W
being  about 20% of the corresponding time for X. Of course,
that  does not mean that the money or SG responses should
all  be completely in line with those proportions – some people
may  interpret the relative severities or degrees of adjustment
or  disruption rather differently – but we  might not be sur-
prised  to find the central tendencies of people’s responses to
be broadly consistent with such relativities.
When we  compute the ratios of MACXi:MACWi,
MAPXi:MAPWi and mXi(1):mWi for each individual in the
sample, we  obtain sample means of 4.48, 4.25 and 3.80
respectively, and corresponding medians of 3.00, 3.00 and
3.15:  in other words, central tendency ‘badness’ multiples in
the region of 3.0–4.5. There are a few individuals who exhibit
rather  higher multiples, but there are only five who generate
an  mXi(1):mWi ratio greater than 10, and the very largest is
15.68.  All this appears broadly consistent with the relativities
in  the timelines set out above.
When we  look at the raw SG responses, we see a central
tendency picture that suggests a little more  distance between
W  and X, but not a lot more:  the sample mean risk of X is a4 This is in line with each of the MAC and MAP responses con-
sidered  separately: his/her MAC for X was 1.5 times his/her MAC
response  for W while his/her MAP response for X was  twice the
figure  for W.little over 0.25 and the median is 0.2, consistent with central
tendency ‘badness’ multiples in the region of 3.5–5.
Those figures are central tendency measures for the sam-
ple  as a whole. However, the process of generating figures
for  mXi(2) involves generating individual ‘badness’ multiples
which are inversely related to individual SG responses, and
this  produces strong asymmetries. To illustrate, consider three
equally spaced SG responses of 0.5, 0.3 and 0.1. These pro-
duce,  respectively, ‘badness’ multiples of approximately 2, 3.33
and 10: that is, equal differences between SG responses are
associated  with very differently spaced ratios. So when we  con-
sider the distribution of mXi(2):mWi ratios and compare them
with  the MAC-MAP-based ratios, we  get a very different pic-
ture:  whereas there were  only five individuals exhibiting a
mXi(1):mWi ratio greater than 10, there are sixty-five whose SG
responses entail badness multiples greater than 10; and while
the  largest mXi(1):mWi ratio was  15.68, there are thirty-seven
SG-based badness multiples higher than that.
This reflects the fact that small perturbations among low
SG  responses can result in very substantial effects on the mul-
tipliers.  We suggest that it is the multiplication of the mWi
figures by an inverse function of small SG probabilities that is
mainly responsible for the nonlinear departure of mXi(2) from
mXi(1). Of course, in the idealised world of error-free deter-
ministic theory, this would not be an issue: both responses
would be precise and fully consistent with each other. But in
the  real world of stated preference surveys, some allowance
has  to be made for the possibility that some questions may  be
more demanding than others and more  vulnerable to noise,
error  or bias. This is undoubtedly a problem for the use of the
chained  approach and we  do not deny it: on the contrary, some
of  us drew particular attention to it in Section 6.3 of Spackman
et  al. (2011), headed ‘Gaps Between Theory and Reality’ – in
particular,  in subsection 6.3.3. However, the existence of such
problems  does not automatically render the whole of the 1997
study  worthless, although it does call for some understanding
of  the nature of the problem and may require the exercise of
some  judgement about the conclusions that should be drawn
from  the data.
In  addition to some susceptibilities in the method, it may
also  be the case that a few respondents give answers which
are  not self-evidently mistaken when considered in isolation
but  which, when taken in conjunction with other answers,
may  generate extreme numbers which we may  wish to treat
with  caution. This brings us naturally to TV’s comments on
the  censoring of data.
5.  TV’s  Section  7:  Censoring  the  data
TV suggest that if the VPF is to be based on the findings of
the  Carthy et al. study, then it should be set equal to the
untrimmed sample mean of the distribution of mDi. On this basis,
TV  criticise the analysis presented in Carthy et al. (a) for its
“.  . .ambivalence between the mean and median as a measure
for  consolidating the different people’s varying valuations. . .”
and (b) because “There is no justification for any ‘trimming’,
which Carthy et al. implemented always in the direction of
reducing  the VPF”.
The  first point to bear in mind is that each individual’s mDi
is the product of the directly estimated mXi(1) and a multiplier
which is an inverse function of the risk of death elicited in
the  SG question balancing injury X against death. So to the
extent  that the above analysis of the relationship between
Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 293–298 297
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(2) and mXi(1) suggests that the SG-based multiplier may
roduce asymmetric disparities and generate a number of
xcessively  large figures, using the untrimmed mean, as TV
dvocate,  may  give undue weight to such excessively large
umbers.
Of  course, it might be argued that the SG-based multipli-
rs  are not excessively large but rather that the divergence
etween mXi(2) and mXi(1) is primarily due to the estimates
f mXi(1) and/or the ratios between mXi(1) and mWi being too
mall. Since we  cannot provide objective proof one way  or the
ther,  there will inevitably be an element of judgement here.
t  is true that the details of some of the judgement calls in
arthy  et al. (1999) are not spelled out as clearly as they might
ave  been and it is fair for TV to draw attention to this. How-
ver,  if we now have to choose between a value for preventing
njury  X based on the mXi(1) data and a value based on the mXi(2)
stimates, what judgmental considerations might we  bring to
ear on the issue?
The  mXi(1) untrimmed mean is £8304: that is, equivalent to
bout  half of the median full time gross annual income in April
997.  Is it plausible that a typical individual would consider the
oss  of 6 months’ gross income roughly equivalent to the loss
f  welfare involved in injury X? Perhaps so: at least, it is not
bviously  implausible.
The  mXi(2) untrimmed mean is £62,258: that is, equivalent
o about 3 years and 9 months of typical full time gross income
n  1997. If we had to judge, we would think it rather less plausi-
le  that this is the appropriate money equivalent for an injury
hat  is completely healed with no further adverse effects after
8  months. Given what we have noted above about the propen-
ity  for the chaining with the SG-based multiplier to produce
ome  very high individual mXi(2) values – £3.17 m and £1.57 m
t  the top end, equivalent to 190 and 95 times the median
nnual gross income, with these two observations between
hem  adding £30,000 to the sample mean – it does not seem
nreasonable to suspect that the untrimmed mXi(2) mean is a
erious  overestimate. The mXi(2) median of £8959 is still higher
han  the untrimmed mXi(1) mean but if the mXi(2) figures are
ubject to the kinds of upward biases discussed earlier, that
edian  may  be a safer measure of central tendency to place
olicy  weight upon.
Since  our concerns about possible nonlinear upwards
iases in the mXi(2) data have their counterparts in the genera-
ion  of the mDi data by chaining mXi(1) responses to an inverse
unction of the SG probabilities of death, it seems reason-
ble  that we  should be equally wary  of the possibility that the
ntrimmed  mean of the mDi data may  suffer from the same
ind  of upward bias.
TV  make a reasonable point when they question the omis-
ion  of 16 respondents who were resistant to taking any risk
f  death: it would undoubtedly be better to include these peo-
le  for whom the VPF could in some cases be quite high. One
ay  of including them is to assign them a ‘badness’ multiplier
s  high as the highest recorded in the normal administration
f  the survey – namely, 1998 – and recompute mDi for all 167
espondents.5 On this basis, the untrimmed mean would be
3.887  m and the median would be £551,842. As with the mXi(2)
ata, the untrimmed mean is more  than 7 times the median;
nd  as with the mXi(2) data, there are a few extraordinarily high
5 There is one case for which the multiplier is shown in our
preadsheet as 9990, which might have been the result of an error
n  entering data: we assign that case a multiplier of 1998 instead.individual numbers – the largest two of which total just over
£235  m,  so that just these two individual observations raise the
untrimmed  sample mean by more  than £1.4 m.
TV may  be reluctant to engage in trimming, but such large
numbers  invite closer inspection. The bigger of the two – in
excess  of £182 m – turns out to be the product of the largest
multiplier of 1998 being applied to an mXi(1) value of £91,205,
where this figure was  computed on the basis of the respondent
stating  a MAC of £1 m.  Further investigation shows that this
respondent  declared an annual income of less than £4000 and
was  therefore stating that he/she would require a figure equiv-
alent  to 250 years’ of current income to compensate for injury
X  – a response which we might regard with some scepticism.
There is considerable scope for debate about just how many
of  the top-end figures should be discounted and by how much;
and  TV make a fair point when they refer to the need to be
cognisant  of outliers at the very low end of the distribution.
However, one could raise the lowest 50% of the distribution
to  the median figure and that would still only counterbalance
less than one-fifth of the single £182 m figure at the top end. It
still seems to us, in the light of everything we  now know about
the  propensity for the SG-based multiplier to skew the distri-
bution  upwards, that an untrimmed mean more  than seven
times  higher than the median is likely to involve giving far too
much  weight to a minority of excessively high numbers. While
such  an untrimmed mean might be the appropriate measure
in  a world of perfectly calibrated individuals with highly artic-
ulated  and precise preferences, we are actually functioning
in  a world where preferences are imprecise and where there
are  reasons to think that noise and error may  operate asym-
metrically. In such circumstances, median responses may  be
less vulnerable; and although we might reasonably expect
some  degree of right skew in distributions related to wealth, so
that medians are liable to understate means, we  would argue
that  data about medians may  provide useful guidance about
lower  bounds of the intervals within which policy values are
located.
Finally,  it is also worth pointing out that we  did not in any
way  “force” the project’s sponsors to base their final decision
concerning the level at which the VPF should be set on the
trimmed  mean or median of mDi, but instead simply recom-
mended  that more  weight should be given to these central
tendency measures than to the untrimmed means, which
were  clearly reported in the paper.
6.  Our  concluding  comments
A number of TV’s criticisms of the study reported in Carthy
et  al. (1999) are ill-conceived, spurious and in some cases
verge  on misrepresentation. Having said that, we readily agree
that  there is a definite and seemingly systematic divergence
between direct and indirect estimates which is illustrated
by  the comparison between mXi(2) and mXi(1). Indeed, we  not
only  agree but we took care to draw attention to some of
the  implications for the VPF estimates in Carthy et al. (1999)
and  made some allowance for the problem in our policy rec-
ommendations. Far from being complacent, we drew further
attention  to the issues in Spackman et al. (2011) and we  are
currently  actively engaged in ongoing research aimed at clar-
ifying  the psychological factors that appear to be driving this
sort  of divergence, with a view to exploring the possibility of
mitigating  the potentially adverse effects of such factors in
stated-preference studies.
298  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 9 3 ( 2 0 1 5 ) 293–298All things considered, one simply has to accept the fact
that  the psychological processes that generate the data used
in  our type of economic analysis will typically be subject
to  some imprecision, “noise” and perhaps some susceptibil-
ity  to bias, so that the results will rarely, if ever, conform
fully with formal deterministic theory. But this can hardly
be  regarded as rendering the findings worthless or uninfor-
mative.  The UK Government recommends that, whenever
possible, preference-based values should be applied in the
appraisal  of proposed projects involving non-market goods –
see the Treasury Green Book (2011), Annex 2. Although it is
challenging  to bridge the gap between theory and practicality
when  eliciting those values, we  consider that the Carthy et al.
study has made a useful contribution in at least two ways:
by  providing evidence which, when blended with judgement,
helped  consolidate the VPF; and by demonstrating the need
and  potential for further work to improve the methodology of
stated  preference elicitation in respects where limitations still
undoubtedly exist.
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